From the ashes of Gaza
Tariq Ali
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/30/gaza-hamas-palestinians-israel1
The assault on Gaza, planned over six months and executed with
perfect timing, was designed largely, as Neve Gordon has rightly
observed, to help the incumbent
parties triumph in the forthcoming Israeli elections. The dead
Palestinians are little more than election fodder in a cynical
contest between the right and the far right in Israel. Washington
and its EU allies, perfectly aware that Gaza was about to be
assaulted, as in the case of Lebanon in 2006, sit back and
watch.
Washington, as is its
wont, blames the pro-Hamas Palestinians, with Obama and Bush
singing from the same AIPAC hymn sheet. The EU politicians, having
observed the build-up, the siege, the collective punishment
inflicted on Gaza, the targeting of civilians etc (for all the gory
detail, see Harvard scholar Sara Roy's chilling
essay in the London Review of Books) were convinced that it
was the rocket attacks that had "provoked" Israel but called on
both sides to end the violence, with nil effect. The moth-eaten
Mubarak dictatorship in Egypt and Nato's favourite Islamists in
Ankara failed to register even a symbolic protest by recalling
their ambassadors from Israel. China and Russia did not convene a
meeting of the UN security council to discuss the
crisis.
As result of official
apathy, one outcome of this latest attack will be to inflame Muslim
communities throughout the world and swell the ranks of those very
organisations that the west claims it is combating in the "war
against terror".
The bloodshed in Gaza
raises broader strategic questions for both sides, issues related
to recent history. One fact that needs to be recognised is that
there is no Palestinian Authority. There never was one. The
Oslo
Accords were an unmitigated
disaster for the Palestinians, creating a set of disconnected and
shrivelled Palestinian ghettoes under the permanent watch of a
brutal enforcer. The PLO, once the repository of Palestinian hope,
became little more than a supplicant for EU
money.
Western enthusiasm for
democracy stops when those opposed to its policies are elected to
office. The west and Israel tried everything to secure a Fatah
victory: Palestinian voters rebuffed the concerted threats and
bribes of the "international community" in a campaign that saw
Hamas members and other oppositionists routinely detained or
assaulted by the IDF, their posters confiscated or destroyed, US
and EU funds channelled into the Fatah campaign, and US congressmen
announcing that Hamas should not be allowed to
run.
Even the timing of the
election was set by the determination to rig the outcome. Scheduled
for the summer of 2005, it was delayed till January 2006 to give
Abbas time to distribute assets in Gaza – in the words of an
Egyptian intelligence officer, "the public will then support the
Authority against Hamas."
Popular desire for a
clean broom after ten years of corruption, bullying and bluster
under Fatah proved stronger than all of this. Hamas's electoral
triumph was treated as an ominous sign of rising fundamentalism,
and a fearsome blow to the prospects of peace with Israel, by
rulers and journalists across the Atlantic world. Immediate
financial and diplomatic pressures were applied to force Hamas to
adopt the same policies as those of the party it had defeated at
the polls. Uncompromised by the Palestinian Authority's combination
of greed and dependency, the self-enrichment of its servile
spokesmen and policemen, and their acquiescence in a "peace
process" that has brought only further expropriation and misery to
the population under them, Hamas offered the alternative of a
simple example. Without any of the resources of its rival, it set
up clinics, schools, hospitals, vocational training and welfare
programmes for the poor. Its leaders and cadres lived frugally,
within reach of ordinary people.
It is this response to
everyday needs that has won Hamas the broad base of its support,
not daily recitation of verses from the Koran. How far its conduct
in the second Intifada has given it an additional degree of
credibility is less clear. Its armed attacks on Israel, like those
of Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade or Islamic Jihad, have been
retaliations against an occupation far more deadly than any actions
it has ever undertaken. Measured on the scale of IDF killings,
Palestinian strikes have been few and far between. The asymmetry
was starkly exposed during Hamas's unilateral ceasefire, begun in
June 2003, and maintained throughout the summer, despite the
Israeli campaign of raids and mass arrests that followed, in which
some 300 Hamas cadres were seized from the West
Bank.
On August 19 2003, a
self-proclaimed "Hamas" cell from Hebron, disowned and denounced by
the official leadership, blew up a bus in west Jerusalem, upon
which Israel promptly assassinated the Hamas ceasefire's
negotiator, Ismail Abu Shanab. Hamas, in turn, responded. In
return, the Palestinian Authority and Arab states cut funding to
its charities and, in September 2003, the EU declared the whole
Hamas movement to be a terrorist organization – a longstanding
demand of Tel Aviv.
What has actually
distinguished Hamas in a hopelessly unequal combat is not dispatch
of suicide bombers, to which a range of competing groups resorted,
but its superior discipline – demonstrated by its ability to
enforce a self-declared ceasefire against Israel over the past
year. All civilian deaths are to be condemned, but since Israel is
their principal practitioner, Euro-American cant serves only to
expose those who utter it. Overwhelmingly, the boot of murder is on
the other foot, ruthlessly stamped into Palestine by a modern army
equipped with jets, tanks and missiles in the longest-armed
oppression of modern history.
"Nobody can reject or
condemn the revolt of a people that has been suffering under
military occupation for 45 years against occupation force,"
said General Shlomo Gazit, former chief of
Israeli military intelligence, in 1993. The real grievance of the
EU and US against Hamas is that it refused to accept the
capitulation of the Oslo Accords, and has rejected every subsequent
effort, from Taba to Geneva, to pass off their calamities on the
Palestinians. The west's priority ever since was to break this
resistance. Cutting off funding to the Palestinian Authority is an
obvious weapon with which to bludgeon Hamas into submission.
Boosting the presidential powers of Abbas – as publicly picked for
his post by Washington, as was Karzai in Kabul – at the expense of
the legislative council is another.
No serious efforts were
made to negotiate with the elected Palestinian leadership. I doubt
if Hamas could have been rapidly suborned to western and Israeli
interests, but it would not have been unprecedented. Hamas'
programmatic heritage remains mortgaged to the most fatal weakness
of Palestinian nationalism: the belief that the political choices
before it are either rejection of the existence of Israel
altogether or acceptance of the dismembered remnants of a fifth of
the country. From the fantasy maximalism of the first to the
pathetic minimalism of the second, the path is all too short, as
the history of Fatah has shown.
The test for Hamas is
not whether it can be house-trained to the satisfaction of western
opinion, but whether it can break with this crippling tradition.
Soon after the Hamas election victory in Gaza, I was asked in
public by a Palestinian what I would do in their place. "Dissolve
the Palestinian Authority" was my response and end the
make-believe. To do so would situate the Palestinian national cause
on its proper basis, with the demand that the country and its
resources be divided equitably, in proportion to two populations
that are equal in size – not 80% to one and 20% to the other, a
dispossession of such iniquity that no self-respecting people will
ever submit to it in the long run. The only acceptable alternative
is a single state for Jews and Palestinians alike, in which the
exactions of Zionism are repaired. There is no other
way.
And Israeli citizens
might ponder the following words from Shakespeare (in The Merchant
of Venice), which I have slightly altered:
"I am a Palestinian.
Hath not a Palestinian eyes? Hath not a Palestinian hands, organs,
dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food,
hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by
the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as
a Jew is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we
not laugh? If you poison us do we not die? And if you wrong us,
shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will
resemble you in that … the villainy you teach me, I will execute;
and it shall go hard but I will better the
instruction."